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Abstract 
Security properties such as confidentiality and au- 
thenticity may  be considered in terms of the flow of 
messages within a network. To the extent that this 
characterisation is justified, the use of a process algebra 
such as Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) 
seems appropriate to describe and analyse them’. This 
paper explores ways in which security properties may 
be described as CSP specifications, how security mech- 
anisms may be captured, and how particular protocols 
designed to provide these properties may be analysed 
within the CSP framework. The paper is  concerned 
with the theoretical basis for  such analysis. A sketch 
verification of a simple example i s  carried out as an 
illustration. 
1 Introduction 
Security protocols are designed to provide proper- 
ties such as authentication, key exchanges, key distri- 
bution, non-repudiation, proof of origin, integrity, con- 
fidentiality and anonymity, for users who wish to ex- 
change messages over a medium over which they have 
little control. These properties are often difficult to 
characterise formally (or even informally). The proto- 
cols themselves often contain a great deal of combinato- 
rial complexity, making their verification extremely dif- 
ficult and prone to  error. This paper promotes the view 
that process algebra can provide a single framework 
both for modelling protocols and for capturing secu- 
rity properties, facilitating verification and debugging. 
It is a discussion paper, proposing possible approaches 
rather than providing definitive answers. It considers 
only confidentiality and authenticity here; other prop- 
erties have been considered in [7]. 
It has been argued that security properties should 
be considered as properties concerning the flow of mes- 
sages within a network. To the extent that this char- 
acterisation is justified, the use of a process algebra 
such as CSP [3] seems appropriate to describe and anal- 
yse them. This paper considers ways in which security 
properties may be described using the notation of CSP, 
how security mechanisms may be captured, and how 
particular protocols designed to  provide these proper- 
ties may be analysed within the CSP framework. 
The approach presented is rather general, and it is 
clear that the modelling of particular properties and 
analysis of particular protocols will require tailoring 
of the model presented here. But this paper aims at 
exploring a general approach rather than trying to  con- 
struct a universal model suitable for handling all pos- 
sible security issues, which is probably an unrealistic 
Security properties are generally properties requir- 
ing that something bad should not occur (though they 
are not exclusively of this form); these tend to be con- 
sidered as safety properties. Of course, particular com- 
munication protocols will also aim to be live (some- 
thing good should occur), in that they will be designed 
to achieve goals such as delivery of messages. But there 
is a distinction to  be drawn between the security re- 
quirements implemented by such a protocol, and its 
liveness requirements which are important for commu- 
nication but which are generally independent of secu- 
rity. It is possible that there are some security proper- 
ties which can be expressed only as liveness properties; 
these are outside the scope of this paper. Hence the 
traces model for CSP will be adequate for our present 
needs: to analyse properties of the form ‘something 
bad should not happen’ it is sufficient to focus on what 
systems may do, rather than what they must do. All 
equivalences and refinements expressed in this paper 
are therefore grounded in the traces model. 
This paper is structured as follows: The relevant 
CSP notation is introduced in Section 2; Section 3 con- 
tains a discussion of how the properties of confidential- 
ity and authentication may be captured within CSP 
independently of security protocols; Section 4 discusses 
the modelling of security protocols and of the networks 
on which they are implemented, and contains an exam- 
goal. 
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ple verification of of a toy confidentiality property to 
illustrate the material; finally Section 5 discusses the 
approach and its potential. 
2 CSP notation 
CSP is an abstract language designed specifically for 
the description of communication patterns of concur- 
rent system components that interact through message 
passing. It is underpinned by a theory which supports 
analysis of systems described in CSP. It is therefore 
well suited to the description and analysis of network 
protocols: protocols can be described within CSP, as 
can the relevant aspects of the network. Their interac- 
tions can be investigated, and certain aspects of their 
behaviour can be verified through use of the theory. 
This section introduces the notation and ideas used in 
this paper. In particular, only the traces model for CSP 
is used here. For a fuller introduction to the language 
the reader is referred to [3]. 
Events 
Systems are modelled in terms of the events that they 
can perform. The set of all possible events (fixed at 
the beginning of the analysis) is denoted E. Events 
may be atomic in structure or may consist of a number 
of distinct components. For example, an event put.5 
consists of two parts: a channel name put,  and a data 
value 5 .  An example of events used in this paper are 
those of the form c.2.j.m consisting of a channel e ,  
a source i, a destination j and a message m. If M 
and N are sets of messages, then M . N  will be the set 
of messages {m.n  I m E M A n E N } .  If m is a 
single message then we elide the set brackets and define 
m.N to be {m} .N .  Thus for example the set of events 
i .N.m = (2.n.m I n E N } .  A channel c is said to be of 
type M if any message c.m E C has that m E M .  
Processes 
Processes are the components of systems. They are the 
entities that are described using CSP, and they are de- 
scribed in terms of the possible events that they may 
engage in. The process STOP is the process that can 
engage in no events at all; it is equivalent to deadlock. 
If P is a process then the process a --+ P is only able 
to initially perform a,  following which it will behave 
in the way described by P.  The process P 0 Q (pro- 
nounced ‘ P  choice &’) can behave either as P or as Q: 
its possible communications are those of P and those 
of Q. An indexed form of choice UiEI P; is able to 
behave as any of its arguments Pi. 
Processes may also be composed in parallel. If A 
is a set of events then the process P I[ A ] \  Q behaves 
as P and Q acting concurrently, with the requirement 
that they have to synchronise on any event in the syn- 
chronisattioin set A; events not in A may be performed 
by either process independently of the other. A special 
form of parallel operator in which the two components 
do not interact on any events is P I I I Q which is equiv- 
alent to P I [{} ]1 Q. 
Processes may be recursively defined by means of 
equatioinal definitions. Process names must appear on 
the left hand side of such definitions, and CSP expres- 
sions which may include those names appear on the 
right hamd side. For example, the definition 
LIGHT = on -+ off -+ LIGHT 
defines a process LIGHT whose only possible be- 
haviour is to perform on and off alternately. 
Traces 
The semantics of a process P is defined to be the set 
of sequences of events (traces(P)) that it may pos- 
sibly perform. Examples of traces include () (the 
empty trace, which is possible for any process) and 
(on ,  off , on) which is a possible trace of LIGHT. 
A useful operator on traces is projection: If A is 
a set of events then the trace tr  1 A is defined to be 
the maximal subsequence of tr  all of whose events are 
drawn from A .  If A is a singleton set ( a }  then we 
overload notation and write tr  1 a for tr  1 { a ) .  
Analysing processes 
Specifications are given as predicates on traces, and a 
process P satisfies a specification S if all of its traces 
satisfy S:  
P sat S e V tr  E traces(P).S 
A process P is refined by a process Q (written 
P Q) if traces(Q) C traces(P). This means that 
if P meets a specification then Q will also meet it. 
Model-checking techniques allow the refinement rela- 
tion P 5 Q to be checked mechanically (for finite- 
state processes) using the tool FDR [l]. Since two pro- 
cesses are equal if each refines the other, this means 
that equality of processes can also be checked using 
FDR. 
3 Security properties 
A network provides a means for users, such as people 
or applkations programs, to communicate by sending 
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and receiving messages. This situation may be mod- 
elled a t  a high level of abstraction in CSP as a process 
NET which provides to each user two ways of inter- 
acting with it: sending messages to other parties, and 
receiving messages from other parties. 
We will assume a universal set MESSAGE of all 
messages that might be sent by any party, and we will 
consider the users to be numbered up to n: 
USER = ( 0 , 1 , .  . ., n> 
The channel employed by user i to input messages to 
the network will be the input channel in.2, of type 
USER.MESSAGE. An input of the form in.i.j.m is 
considered an instruction from user i to transmit mes- 
sage m to user j .  
eventually become available. Generally these proper- 
ties are expressed precisely and formally in terms of 
the semantic models of CSP. 
Although it is necessary to know the internal struc- 
ture of the network in order to demonstrate that it 
provides particular services, the services or properties 
themselves should be expressible simply in terms of the 
interactions the network offers its users. This is the 
case for common communications protocols, and in this 
paper we take the view that security properties can be 
captured in the same way. We therefore examine and 
offer definitions of these properties before considering 
the network at any finer level of detail. 
There are two views from which security properties 
can be considered: 
NETWORK 
Figure 1. High level view of the network 
The channel employed by user i to receive messages 
output from the network will be the output channel 
out.2, of type USER.MESSAGE. An output of the 
form 0ut.i.j.m is considered to be receipt by user i of 
message m sent by user j .  
Users’ requirements on the network are expressed 
in terms of the behaviour of the network as a whole, 
and CSP has been used successfully for some years in 
the description and analysis of communications proto- 
cols. Common safety and liveness properties are read- 
ily expressed in terms of the possible behaviour of the 
network with respect to the users. For example, the 
property that no spurious messages are generated is 
captured as a safety property that requires any output 
message to have previously been input: if 0ut.i.j.m 
appears in a trace, then in.j.i.m must have already 
occurred. The liveness requirement that no message is 
lost can be formalised as follows: for any input mes- 
sage in.i.j.m the corresponding output 0ut.j.i.m must 
0 from the viewpoint of the users of the network, 
who do not know which other parties are to be 
trusted. Properties expressed from this viewpoint 
will generally include assumptions (implicitly or 
explicitly) that a user’s communication partner 
will not act contrary to the aims of the protocol. 
For example, that any shared secrets should not 
be disclosed to third parties. 
0 from a high-level ‘God’s eye view’ which identi- 
fies those nodes which follow their protocols faith- 
fully, and also identifies those which are engaging 
in more general activity, perhaps in attempting to 
find a flaw in a protocol. If this view is taken, then 
care should be taken to ensure that this privileged 
information is not accidentally used in the protocol 
description: the responses of a node should not be 
dependent on information which is available only 
at the high-level view. In some circumstances, a 
node may not have knowledge concerning its com- 
munication partner; in other cases, a protocol may 
be invoked only when communicating with partic- 
ular known and trusted users (how this knowledge 
and trust is obtained is outside the scope of this 
report). 
In this report we will follow the high-level view. This 
means we can postulate the existence of an enemy 
whose identity is known and can be used in the for- 
mulation of security properties. We will use 0 E USER 
as the name of this enemy process. Later we will jus- 
tify the decision to use only a single enemy, by arguing 
that further enemies do not increase the vulnerability 
of protocols: the single enemy in a sense encapsulates 
the behaviour of all enemies. 
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Confidentiality 
Confidentiality for a particular set of messages M 
is achieved when users may communicate any mes- 
sage drawn from the set M without the possibility of 
any user other than the intended recipient receiving 
it. In other words, if an input 2n.i.j.m occurs, then 
any (subsequent) output 0ut.h.l.m must be for user j: 
i.e. h = j. Thus given user j and message m, if an 
output 0ut.j.i.m occurs (for some i) then some user 1 
(not necessarily i) must have sent that message to j: 
there must be some previous input ofthe form in.l.j.m. 
Thus j cannot obtain messages that were intended for 
some other user. 
For analysis purposes, we will consider the system 
from the God's-eye view: the only user which might 
obtain messages intended for some other user will be 
user 0. Hence confidentiality will be captured as a spec- 
ification requiring that any message output to user 0 
must have actually been sent to user 0. We restrict at- 
tention to the message set M as being those messages 
which are intended to remain confidential. We also as- 
sume they cannot be generated by user 0 (which would 
be true for example for signed messages), though this 
is a simplifying assumption that is not justified in all 
circumstances. This assumption is implicit in the def- 
inition, since otherwise 0 could simply guess any con- 
fidential message. Other messages (such as encrypted 
messages or control messages) will in general be avail- 
able to eavesdroppers, but confidentiality is not con- 
cerned with protecting these. 
These considerations may be captured as a trace 
specification 
Definition 3.1 N E T  provides confidentiality for the 
set of messages M if and only if 
NET sat 'dm : M o tr  I out.0.USER.m # () 
+ tr in. USER.0.m # () 
13 
This definition states that any message m which is out- 
put to user 0 (i.e. evidenced by a message out.O.i.m 
in the trace t r )  must have initially been sent to user 0 
(i.e. there must be some j for which in.j.O.m appears 
in the trace). 
This may also be expressed within the CSP process 
algebra: 
Theorem 3.2 A process N E T  provides confidential- 
ity in the sense of Definition 3.1 if and only if 
'dm : M N E T  I [  in.US'ER.O.mIl STOP = 
NET I [  out.0.USER.m ] I  STOP 
in. USER.V.m, 
0 
This stsites that if input of message m from any user 
to user 0 is blocked, then so is output of message m to 
user 0. 
Observe that this is not equivalent to 
N E T  I[ in. USER.O.MIl STOP = 
N E T  I[ out.0. USER.M ] I  STOP 
in. USER.V.M 
For exalmple, N E T  = in.1.0.ml -+ out.0,l.ml + 
in.1.2.nz2 -+ out.O.l.m2 + STOP meets the latter 
equivalence but not the former: a message m2 from 
user 1 to  user 2 has been output by user 0, and this 
breaches confidentiality (assuming ml ,  m2  E M ) .  
This property may also be captured in the traces 
model, as the property CONF 
CC)NF(tr) 2 messages(tr [ out.0. U5'ER.M) 
messages( tr 1 in.  USER.0.M) 
This states that the messages (from message set M )  
output from user 0 must be a subset of those that were 
sent to it. In other words, user 0 cannot obtain any 
messages from M that are not sent to it. 
The fact that this property is a sat specification 
means that it is preserved by refinement. 
A simlplification 
Observe that if no messages are ever sent to 0 (perhaps 
if users are communicating with users they know and 
trust to be honest) then the characterisation of con- 
fidentiality may be simplified, since no messages will 
ever be sent to user 0. 
The definition simplifies to 
N E T  sat 'd m : M tr out.O. USER.m = () 
which is equivalent to the simpler form 
N E T  sat tr 1 out.O. USER.M = () 
This property may be expressed entirely within the 
process algebra in a number of different ways. The first 
way calptures the idea that if attention is focussed en- 
tirely upon events from out.O. USER.M, then nothing 
should be (observed: 
N E T  \ (C \ out.0.USER.M) = STOP 
The process STOP is a refinement of NET \ (E \ 
out.0.USER.M) (since in the traces model STOP is a 
refinem.ent of every process), so achieving equality is 
equivalent to obtaining refinement in the other direc- 
tion: 
STOP & N E T  \ (E \ out.O. USER.M) 
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An alternative characterisation is obtained by consider- 
ing the effects of preventing N E T  from performing any 
events in out.0.USER.M. A system providing confi- 
dentiality should not be affected by this restriction: 
N E T  = N E T  I[ out.O. USER.MIl STOP 
Since restricting the behaviour of N E T  can only reduce 
its behaviours, it follows automatically that the restric- 
tion is a refinement of N E T .  Hence the processes are 
equivalent precisely when there is a refinement in the 
other direction: 
N E T  I[ out.O. USER.M]I STOP E N E T  
A final characterisation regards the system as accept- 
able if every event it can perform is in the set C \ 
out.O. i7SER.M. In other words, everything it can per- 
form is also possible for a process which can always 
perform any of those events: 
All of these characterisations are provably equivalent 
to the assertion N E T  sat tr 1 out.0. USER.M = () 
It is straightforward using the process algebra to 
show that if a system provides confidentiality for two 
sets M 1  and M 2  separately, then it provides confiden- 
tiality for both sets simultaneously: if 
N E T  I[ out.O. USER.M1]1 STOP = N E T  
and 
N E T  I[ out.0. USER.M2]1 STOP = N E T  
then 
N E T  I [  out.O. USER.(Ml U M2)]1  STOP 
I [  out.O. USEB.M2]1 S T O P )  
= ( ( N E T  I[ out.0. U S E R . M l ] (  S T O P )  
= 
= N E T  
N E T  I[ out.0. USER.M2]1 STOP 
Message Authentication 
This property requires that messages can be guar- 
anteed to be ‘authentic’, in the sense that a particu- 
lar message purporting to have come from a particular 
source really did come from that source. Authentica- 
tion requires that messages cannot be forged. 
In abstract terms, event b ‘authenticates’ event a 
if the observation of b is possible only if a occurred 
previously: the observation of b provides ‘evidence’ of 
a’s previous occurrence. 
Definition 3.3 Event b authenticates event a in pro- 
cess P if and only if P sat A UTH ( t r )  , where 
A U T H ( t r )  = tr  1 b # () =+ tr  1 U # (> 
0 
Observe that this specification does not restrict the 
number of occurrences of event b to each occurrence 
of event a. 
The expression of this property in terms of a s a t  
specification demonstrates that it is preserved by re- 
finement. 
This specification can also be captured as a process 
algebraic equation. 
P I[ a ,  b ] l  STOP = P I [  a31 STOP 
And since it is always the case that 
P I[ a ] [  STOP 5 P I[ a ,  b]l STOP 
the condition is equivalent to  
P I [ %  bll  STOP !z p I [ . ]  
For example, the process 
P = a - + b  
cl 
STOP 
+ STOP 
b -+ c -+ STOP 
has c authenticating b: 
P I[ b ,  C ] \  STOP = a -+ STOP 
= P l [ b ] l S T O P  
but it does not have b authenticating a: 
P l [ a , b ] l S T O P  = STOP 
# 
= P l [ a ] l S T O P  
b -+ c -+ STOP 
In other words, a b event can occur even if a did not 
occur previously. 
In the context of sending and receiving messages, we 
would require a received message 0ut.j.i.m to authen- 
ticate a sent message in.i.j .m. In other words, receipt 
of the message i.m (‘m from i’) by node j is possible 
only if that message was sent by node i. Thus on a sys- 
tem N E T  consisting of the medium, enemy and nodes, 
the property to  check would be 
N E T  I[ in.i.j.m ] I  STOP = 
N E T  I[ zn.i.j.m]l STOP 
0ut.j.i.m 
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For example, a buffer process 
COPY = in?x --+ out!x -+ COPY 
has 0ut.x authenticating 2n.x for any x :  no message 
can be output unless it has previously been input. 
This characterisation of authentication can be pro- 
moted to sets of events. The set B authenticates the 
set A in P if any message in B authenticates any of 
the messages in A .  In other words, if any of the mes- 
sages in B is seen, then one of the messages in A must 
previously have occurred. This is captured as follows 
Definition 3.4 B authenticates A in P if and only if 
P I [ A U B ] ( S T O P  = P I [ A ] l S T O P  
(3 
This form might be useful when we wish to check 
that a message is genuine even when its origina- 
tor is unknown. This could be captured as the set 
0ut . j .  USER.m authenticating the set in.  l7SER.j.m. 
The authenticating message indicates that some honest 
node generated the original message. 
The buffer process COPY has the weaker property 
of 0ut.M authenticating in .M:  no output can occur 
before input. This property is strictly weaker than the 
previous property, in which every output authenticates 
a corresponding input. For example, a random bit gen- 
erator which allows any bit to be output following any 
input bit 
RAND = in?x + ( out!0 + RAND 
0 out!l  -+ RAND) 
also has out.{O, 1) authenticating in.{O, 1)-no bit can 
be output if there wasn’t previously an input-but does 
not have 0ut.x authenticating 2n.c for any particular 
.J, 
The definition provides a straightforward proof of 
transitivity of authentication: if C authenticates B ,  
and B authenticates A ,  then C authenticates A: 
P I [ A U C ] I S T O P  
= P I[ A ] /  STOP I[ C ] l  STOP 
= P I [ A U B ] J S T O P J [ C ] I S T O P  
= P I [ A U B U C ] I S T O P  
= 
= 
= P I [ A U B ] I S T O P  
P I[ B U C]l STOP I [  All STOP 
P I [  B]1 STOP I[ All STOP 
= P I [ A ] l S T O P  
4 The network 
Architecture 
A common architecture for which security protocols 
are designed consists of a network of nodes (typically 
workstatioins) which are able to communicate asyn- 
chronously by sending messages to each other over a 
medium, which acts as a postal service. The need for 
security arises from the fact that the users of this ser- 
vice (such 8 s  people, and applications programs) do not 
have control over the medium, and so it is possible for 
malicious agents to intercept or interfere with network 
traffic. The need for confidentiality in the face of an 
insecure medium creates the need for some form of en- 
cryption, and the need for authenticity when message 
forgery is possible also raises the need for some form of 
security mechanism. 
A common approach to modelling this situation is 
to consider a set of nodes as connected to the medium, 
which is modelled as a single process. Although the 
medium will in general consist of a network of pro- 
cesses, this network may be considered at a higher level 
of abstraction as a single process. The only interactions 
the nodes may have with other nodes must be through 
this medium. As discussed earlier, we will find it con- 
venient to model malicious interference by means of a 
separate einemy process node 0 which manipulates the 
essentially passive medium. 
Thus the service provided to the users is modelled 
as 
NODE;) I[ trans, recl1 MEDIUM ( I I/ I i E rJSER\O 
The nodes are unable to interact directly, so their op- 
eration is entirely interleaved. They all communicate 
with the medium by means of channels trans and rec, 
used by tlhe nodes to transmit and receive messages 
respectively. 
Quite often the distinction between a user and the 
node by which the user communicates with the net- 
work 1:s bllurred when addressing security properties. 
An authentication check that a particular server re- 
mains up requires a response directly from that server 
rather than from the network operator responsible for 
it. Hence nn some cases it is appropriate to think of the 
user and the node as being the same entity. However, 
for the purposes of this paper we find it convenient to 
treat them as distinct. 
All forms of interference will be modelled by an in- 
truder process ENEMY = NODE0 that is able to alter 
the coindition of the medium via certain channels not 
available to the nodes. The entire system will be de- 
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scribed by 
NET (IIlitCrSER\O NODEi) 
I [  trans, recl1 
MEDIUM 
I [  leak, kill, a d d ] )  
ENEMY 
The process NET will always refer to this configura- 
tion, though it will generally be parameterised by par- 
ticular descriptions of the node processes NODE;, and 
of the processes MEDIUM and E N E M Y .  
I f  
Figure 2. Architecture of the network 
Messages 
The kind of messages that are transmitted and re- 
ceived will depend upon the particular protocol being 
modelled, so it is probably best, at least initially, to 
defer definition of the type of these channels until we 
come to model a protocol. We can note that each node 
NODEi will use channels tran5.i and rec.i to interact 
with the medium, so trans and rec may be thought 
of as denoting families of channels rather than single 
channels. It is also likely that a destination field will 
be required as part of the message, as well as the mes- 
sage itself and possibly an encryption. It is not clear 
at this stage how best to handle encrypted messages: 
in order to maintain the possibility that the number of 
encryption levels may be arbitrarily large, a recursive 
data structure will be required, perhaps along the lines 
of 
MESSAGE ::= PLAINTEXT 
I K E Y  
1 K E Y  (MESSAGE) 
I MESSAGE.MESSAGE 
and even plaintext messages might have some non- 
trivial structure: 
PLAINTEXT ::= USER 
I T E X T  
I PLAINTEXT.PLAINTEXT 
This is not the only structure appropriate for mes- 
sages. For example, in a key-exchange protocol, keys 
themselves take on a dual role, being used to en- 
crypt messages, but also comprising the messages to 
be encrypted. Thus for key-exchange mechanisms, 
the set K E Y  should also be included as possible 
PLAINTEXT.  Other cryptographic mechanisms such 
as hash functions may be included as possible mes- 
sages, in which case the definition of MESSAGE 
might be extended with two extra lines HASH and 
HASH(MESSAGE).  For the purposes of this paper, 
we will use the definition of MESSAGE as given above, 
while remembering that this can be varied according to 
modelling needs. 
It will also prove useful, when considering what an 
enemy may deduce about messages it has received, to 
be able to extract the information in messages. An 
extraction function kernel may be defined by struc- 
tural induction on MESSAGE; and kerneh defined for 
PLAINTEXT.  In the case we have given above, these 
functions will be defined as follows: 
Icernel(p) = ICerneh(p) 
kernel(lc) = ( I C }  
kernel(k(m)) = kernel(m) 
kernel(m1.mz) = kernel(m1) U kernel(m2) 
kerneb(u) = { U }  
kerneb(t)  = { t }  
kerne&(pl.pz) = kerneh(p1) U kernek(p2) 
This definition contains a clause for each clause of 
MESSAGE, reflecting the data structure in a natural 
way. 
The function kernel lifts to sets in the obvious way. 
Message properties 
An intruder is able to manipulate the medium in 
The approach taken here of using particular ways. 
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events to signal particular modes of interference (in 
preference to having them occur nondeterministically) 
was originally taken in [6]. The advantage of this ap- 
proach is that it allows greater control over the level 
and type of interference that may occur. 
However, the enemy is not capable of producing all 
messages: for example, it cannot generate a message 
encrypted with a key it does not have (though of course 
it could reproduce such a message if it had previously 
received it). 
In fact, the messages the intruder is able to generate 
will depend on the messages it has already seen pass 
as network traffic, the messages it is already able to 
generate, and the keys it has seen or which it owns. 
We will use an information system [5 ]  to define which 
messages can be generated by the enemy. It will have 
a trivial consistency relation: any set of messages is 
consistent. The definition of the relation t- of the in- 
formation system will be dependent on, and should en- 
capsulate the encryption mechanism. An information 
system defines a relation t- between finite sets of to- 
kens and single tokens, indicating when the token can 
be generated from the set. In this case, we will use the 
relationship to indicate when the enemy, or indeed any 
other agent, can generate a particular message given 
the messages it has already seen. 
Consider an example in which messages may be en- 
crypted by means of either secret keys or public keys. 
There will be the set PUBLIC of all the nodes’ pub- 
lic keys-for simplicity we assume one for each node 
PUBLIC = { p i  1 i E USER) C_ K E Y  
There will also be the set S of all the nodes’ secret 
keys-one for each node 
SECRET = {s, 1 i E USER) 5 K E Y  
This set is distinct from the set of public keys: 
SECRET n PUBLIC = 0 
Finally there will be a set of shared keys SHARED, 
distinct both from public and secret keys: 
SECRET fl SHARED = 0 
PUBLIC n SHARED = IZI 
The entailment relation t-: Pfi,( MESSA G E )  
MESSAGE will be a relation between a finite set 
X 
of 
messages (that we think of as the enemy having seen) 
and messages that the enemy can generate. The re- 
lation is closed under the axioms for an information 
system: 
A l .  If m E B then B I- m 
A2. If B I-. m and B C B’ then B‘ I- m 
A3. If B Ik mi for each mi E B’ and B’ F m then 
B t - m  
We will abuse notation and allow the relation between 
possibly infinite sets and messages: 
S t- me 3 T 5”” S e T I -  m 
We encapsulate the way in which messages can be 
generated by considering the possible structures for a 
message: 
M l .  B t - m A B k k  3 B t k ( m )  
M2. B t mp A B  I- m2 # B I- m1.m2 
where m ,  ml and m2 are messages, and k is a key. 
Certain properties of particular encoding mecha- 
nisms mtiy also be captured by providing additional 
inference rules. For example, the relationship between 
secret and. public keys may be captured by the follow- 
ing pak of rules: 
KP. {ya(s,i(m,))> 1- m 
K2. {s , (p;(m))’)  I- m 
where pi (5 P and si  E S. 
For example, these rules allow us to deduce the obvi- 
ous result that possession of a message encrypted with 
a secret key (s i (m),  say), together with possession of 
the public key, allows the original message to be re- 
trieved: 
I. { p i , s i ( m ) }  t- s i (m)  A1 
2. ( P i ,  s , ( m ) )  t- Pa A1 
4. {Pi, s i ( m ) )  I- m 3, K1, A3 
The appropriate rule for shared keys is that possession 
of a shared key together with a message encrypted with 
that key allows generation of the original message: 
K3. {k7 Ic(m)} I- m if k E SHARED 
It is also possible to encode various other deductions 
we might wish to include in the capability of t,he enemy, 
for example deducing a key from observing both an 
encoded message and that message in plaintext: 
K4. { m, k ( m ) )  t- IC 
The rules that we give model different encryption 
and dlecryption capabilities of the enemy. 
The rules can also be used to encapsulate properties 
of encryption. For example, if encryption were com- 
mutative, then we could include the rule 
K5. {h, h(m)} t- h 2 ( h ( m ) )  
3. {Pi, s i (m) )  t- . d s z ( m ) )  MI, 1, 2 
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Medium 
The description of MEDIUM involves a number of 
decisions about the best way to model the network 
medium . 
We must allow the possibility of an intruder, who 
is able to manipulate the medium in particular ways. 
This could be done by building the intruder into the 
medium (so the medium itself has the capability of in- 
terfering with message traffic in particular ways); but 
we prefer to follow Roscoe’s approach [6] of including 
a separate model of the intruder. This second ap- 
proach gives greater separation between the medium 
itself, which would then be considered as essentially a 
passive service provided to the various nodes, and a ma- 
licious agent who has particular capabilities to manip- 
ulate the medium in particular ways. The capabilities 
of this agent will be made more explicit, and manipu- 
lation of the medium will be associated with particular 
events, which will make attacks on protocols easier to  
follow and understand. 
The medium (containing the set of messages B )  may 
be described initially as MEDIUM(D),  where: 
MEDIUM(B)  = I N P U T ( B )  
U 
0 UTP U T ( B )  
0 
I A ( B )  
The process I N P U T ( B )  permits input to the medium. 
We must decide on the type of messages that the 
medium will accept and offer. For the purposes of 
this paper, we will separate out the destination and 
source from the body of the message. Again there are 
other possibilities, for example, if the message is to be 
broadcast to all users then no explicit destination field 
is required. 
I N P U T ( B )  = 
ai trans.i?j?x -+ MEDIUM(B U { i . j . z } )  
Here the channel trans is of type 
USER. USER.MESSAGE. A message trans.i.j.m 
should be thought of as node i sending an input 3.m 
to the medium, indicating the wish that message m 
be delivered to node j. Thus i is the source, j the 
destination, and m the message. 
We have abstracted away refusals, in the sense that 
input can never be refused, which amounts to making 
the assumption that nothing can be deduced from how 
or when the messages are accepted. This is a reason- 
able assumption, since there are protocols currently in 
use to perform tasks such as masking network traffic. 
Hence at this level of abstraction we can assume that 
messages are always accepted by the network. (If this 
is later felt to be unrealistic, the definition of INPUT 
can be altered accordingly, so that messages may not 
Be input after the number of messages in the network 
reaches some capacity threshold) 
The process OUTPUT allows output from the 
medium: 
O U T P U T ( B )  = 
rec.Q!i!x -+ MEDIUM(B \ {i . j .x})  
‘i.j .x€B 
Here the channel rec is of type 
USER. USER.MESSAGE. A message rec.j.i.m 
corresponds to the receipt of a message m by node Q 
which is labelled as coming from source node i. 
Note that an empty external choice is simply equiv- 
alent to STOP,  so when the set B is empty (Le. the 
medium contains no messages) there is no possibility 
Finally, the process I A ( B )  describes the possible in- 
teractions with the medium due to Intruder Actions. 
A perfectly secure medium would treat this part of the 
process description as STOP. In cases we are consider- 
ing, we model the ways in which the medium is suscep- 
tible to interference. Mere, the medium is vulnerable 
to having messages removed, added, or leaked. 
of output. 
I A ( B )  = 
kill -+ ObEB MEDIUM(B \ ( 6 ) )  if B # 0 
0 
add?i?j?x -+ MEDIUM(B U { i . j . x} )  
0 
U 
MEDIUM (0) X B = 0  
leuk!i!j!z -+ MEDIUM(B)  
i . j . x E B  
Enemy action 
IA modelling the enemy we are concerned with mes- 
sages that the enemy is able to generate. These may 
be used to disrupt a protocol, or may correspond to 
information about what the enemy has discovered con- 
cerning supposedly confidential messages. 
Certain assumptions may be made concerning the 
enemy, depending on the property that is under analy- 
sis. When checking confidentiality, it is often assumed 
that the enemy is unable to generate those messages M 
(which can be generated by the users) that should be 
kept confidential. On the other hand, when checking 
authentication it should be assumed that the enemy 
(as well as the honest users) is capable of generating 
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those messages whose authenticity is ensured by the 
protocol, since if the enemy is unable to generate them 
then there is no need for an authentication protocol. 
For integrity, it is assumed that the enemy is capable 
of generating messages from M. 
These assumptions may be incorporated into the de- 
scription of the enemy, which may then be parame- 
terised by a set of messages S that it has seen, and a 
set of messages INIT that it is initially able to gener- 
ate. The assumptions can be expressed as conditions 
on INIT and on the set of messages M which the par- 
ticular security property is concerned with. 
The question also arises as to whether it is suffi- 
cient to model enemy actions using a single ENEMY 
process. In principle it is possible that a number of 
malicious agents acting together might effect an at- 
tack where a single agent would be unable to do so. 
Whether or not this is possible in the model being de- 
veloped here depends on the actual description of the 
process E N E M Y .  In fact, the description to be pre- 
sented enjoys the property that 
ENEMY = ENEMY 1 1 1  ENEMY 
Hence for all analysis done at the level of traces we 
see that any number of enemies acting together are 
encapsulated within the description of a single enemy. 
In addition to the messages that can be generated 
from those messages already seen, the enemy is able to 
generate particular plaintext messages. Furthermore, 
the enemy should be considered to be in possession of 
all of the nodes' public keys, and all of the users' names. 
We therefore use a set INIT to model all of the infor- 
mation initially in the possession of the enemy. Thus 
we have PUBLIC 5 INIT and USER 5 INIT.  The 
relation k gives the capability of the enemy to generate 
messages from messages already in its possession. The 
CSP description of the enemy will use this relation. 
The set S records those messages that have been read 
from the medium. This is initialised to 0, so ENEMY 
is defined to be E N E M Y ( m ) ,  where 
E N E M Y ( S )  = KILL(S) 
0 
A D D ( S )  
U 
L E A K (  S )  
KNOWS(S)  
The first option allows the enemy to kill a message-to 
remove it from the medium. It is described simply as 
KILL( S) = kill + ENEMY ( S )  
In fact, when dealing with trace properties of commu- 
nication protocols, the ability of the enemy to kill mes- 
sages is entirely irrelevant. Although the possible re- 
moval of messages from the medium can interfere with 
liveness properties of communications protocols, it can- 
not compromise properties expressed only in terms of 
traces. This is because the medium allows the reorder- 
ing of inessages, so any particular message could al- 
ways be ignored and remain in the medium without 
being killed. Any protocol that guarantees a security 
property if the enemy is unable to kill messages will 
therefore guarantee it in any case. An equally useful 
definition of KILL(S) would be STOP (which would 
be equivalent to omitting this option entirely). 
The second course of action available to the enemy 
is to insert any message that it can generate onto the 
medium. These are any messages that can be generated 
from it:; initial set INIT together with the messages S 
that have since come into its possession. 
Observe that this description incorporates the ability of 
the enemy to manipulate message address fields, thus 
giving the impression that a message comes from a 
source other than the genuine source. 
If the enemy is considered to be simply an eaves- 
dr0ppe.r with no power to add messages to the medium, 
then the ADD component would simply be modelled 
as STOP (or omitted entirely). 
The third option allows it to observe any message 
currently on the medium: 
L E A K ( S )  = leak?i?j?a + E N E M Y ( S  U {z)) 
The final option is included to model the enemy's 
knowledge of particular messages. This is accomplished 
by allowing the enemy to output any message that can 
in fact be generated. 
The chainnel out.0 is used to indicate those messages 
that the enemy can deduce from what has already been 
seen together with what was known initially. 
The argument S represents the set of messages that 
the enemy has already seen. Normally this will be the 
empty set at the beginning of a protocol run, but it is 
possible to model the effect that possession of a partic- 
ular key might have on the vulnerability of a protocol, 
by including such a key, or some other message, in the 
set S. 
Observe that we have allowed the insertion of any 
message into the medium, so in particular false sources 
can be attached to messages. Rerouting of a message 
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can also be modelled, by having the enemy read it via 
leak, kill it (this is cleaner though not essential, as al- 
ready discussed), and then add the same message with 
a different destination field back to the medium. 
Now the assumption that is made in the case of con- 
fidentiality can be formalised. We are assuming that 
none of the messages that we wish to keep confiden- 
tial are in fact in the kernel of the messages that can 
initially be generated by the enemy: 
M n kernel(INIT) = 
On the other hand, for integrity and authenticity, we 
are (implicitly) assuming that 
M n INIT # 
in the sense that protocols designed to provide these 
services are intended to deal with messages that can 
be generated by an enemy. 
When checking a confidentiality protocol, strong use 
is made of this assumption, since if the enemy can out- 
put a message that is supposed to be confidential then 
the protocol is considered to be insecure. However, 
there are situations such as key-exchange where a pro- 
tocol is designed to provide both confidentiality and 
authenticity, in which case it is reasonable to begin 
analysis with M r! INIT # 0. In such situations, the 
above modelling of what the enemy knows is not ade- 
quate, and it would be necessary to construct a more 
sophisticated, complex model of the enemy which keeps 
track of incoming and outgoing messages and outputs 
on out.O only those messages it deduces have been gen- 
erated by the legitimate users, in particular ignoring 
those messages in M that it puts onto the medium and 
then reads back via leak. We will not pursue this fur- 
ther in this paper, but will observe that it is a situation 
to  bear in mind. 
Nodes 
We must consider the nodes-which are the link 
between the user and the medium-to be under the 
control of the user. It is the nodes that will provide 
the security facilities required by the users, such as en- 
crypting and deciphering messages. 
The (finite) set of all nodes will be labelled using the 
set USER = (0, I, . . . , n}. 
The nodes provide the means by which users send 
messages over the network. A user communicating 
with the network is in fact communicating with the 
corresponding node. Nodes interact with users by 
inputting plaintext messages with intended destina- 
tions, and outputting such messages together with 
their source. The process NODE; thus communi- 
cates with its user via channels in.i and 0ut.i of 
type USER.PLAINTEXT.  An input 2n.i.j.m to node 
NODE, is interpreted as a request from user i to send 
inessage m to user j .  Similarly, an output communi- 
cation 0ut.i.j.m is interpreted as delivery to user i of 
message m purporting to come from j. 
Nodes (with the exception of node 0) interact with 
the medium by transmitting (possibly enciphered) 
messages together with other control messages, in- 
tended recipients, and any other messages employed 
by the protocol being used. The channels used are 
trans.i for transmission, and rec.i for receipt of mes- 
sages. These channels are of type USER.MESSAGE, 
where the set MESSAGE contains both plain and en- 
crypted messages (as discussed later). A communica- 
tion trans.i.j.m corresponds to NODEi placing mes- 
sage m with destination j onto the medium. A com- 
munication rec.2. j . m  corresponds to NQDEi receiving 
message m from the medium, with source purporting 
to  be j .  
The description of a NODEi process will depend on 
the security property we are aiming to verify of the 
network. For confidentiality, authenticity, anonymity 
and integrity its description will consist of a CSP im- 
plementation of the particular protocol under analysis. 
For example, an extremely simple protocol to provide 
confidentiality of messages sent from user 1 to user 2 
will be implemented using NQDEz’s public key p2 and 
secret key s2 as follows: 
NODE1 = in.l.2?x -+ trans.l!2!pz(z) -+ NODE1 
NODE2 = rec.2?j?y -+ 
STOP if s ~ ( Y )  PLAINTEXT 
out.2!j!s2( y )  
-+ NODE2 otherwise 
where s2(p2(z))  = 5 for any message I .  Observe that 
this protocol does not ensure authenticity. 
The situation is different in the case of non- 
repudiation. In this case, verification is from the 
judge’s viewpoint, and the judge does not have con- 
trol over the nodes used in a non-repudiation protocol. 
In fact, from the judge’s viewpoint, the parties could 
each be dishonest. Indeed, it is this possibility that 
generates the need for a non-repudiation protocol in 
the first place. 
The judge has to allow for the possibility that 
each node has the capabilities of node 0. Thus non- 
repudiation has to be established in the context of 
nodes which can kill ,  add, and leak messages as well 
as interact with the medium in the usual ways. The 
nodes for which non-repudiation should be established 
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are therefore or alternatively as 
NODEi(M) = 
in. i?j?s  + NODEi(M U (8)) 
out.i!j!z -+ NODE,(M) INIT” MI- 5 
‘ J I N I T U M I - x  trans.i!j!z -+ NODEi(M)  
0 rec.z?j?z + N O D E i ( M U { z } )  
m I T u  II- 
0 leak?Z?j?z -+ NODEi(M U {z}) 
0 kill -+ NODEi(M) 
add! i! j !z  + NODEi(M))  
From a modelling point of view the interfaces of these 
processes with the network must be expanded to in- 
clude the channels add, leak and kill. 
Since the node is able to generate its own plaintext 
messages, the in.i  channel is perhaps redundant, but 
is retained as a source of messages so that particular 
non-repudiation protocols will refine this node. 
The set of messages M corresponding to the initial 
state of the node will contain all of the keys which the 
node may use to encrypt and decrypt messages. 
Meadows’ example 
In order to illustrate the above material, we will 
present a simple example used in [4] and [2]. It is 
not even a protocol, but is instead a simple example 
designed purely for illustrative purposes. In fact, it is 
not the kind of example that best illustrates the bene- 
fits of the process algebra approach, since process alge- 
bra would be of more use in exploring subtle patterns 
of interactions between different parties; here the in- 
teractions are fairly simple. However, it illustrates the 
approach. Although the proof of such an obvious prop- 
erty seems unduly long, it is also lengthier than might 
be expected in [4] and [2]. This is because a significant 
amount of formalisation needs to be done before the 
proof can actually proceed, 
The example consists of a legitimate user who en- 
crypts received messages with a particular key, and re- 
turns them to the medium. This could be described 
as a legitimate node (number 1 for definiteness) which 
receives messages on rec.1, encrypts them, and returns 
them on trans.1. The process algebra is as follows: 
NODE1 = rec.l?j?z -+ t rans . l ! j !k(z )  -+ NODE1 
where k is a key possessed by NODE1. 
The aim is to establish that the enemy cannot obtain 
a particular message a that it does not already possess. 
This is expressed as confidentiality with respect to a: 
NET = NET I[ out.O.O.a]l STOP 
NET sat ( t r  1 out.0.0.a = ()) 
We make the standard assumption for confidentiality, 
that the enemy is not in possession of any messages 
containing a: 
KERNEL( a )  sf kernel( INIT) 
We ma,y take the description of NET to consist 
of the node NODE1, the initially empty medium 
MEDICrM(@), and the enemy who has initially learned 
nothing: ENEMY (0). 
It wiU prove useful to extract certain sets of mes- 
sages from traces of the system: 
LEAK(tr) = {m I3 i , j  0 tr 1 Zealc.i.j.m # ()} 
A D D ( t r )  = { m  I3i , j  0 tr 1 add.2.j.m # ()} 
{m I 3 j  0 tr 1 trans.k.j .m # ()} 
RE:Ck(tr) = {m I3j 0 tr 1 rec.k.j.m # ()} 
OUTo(tr) = {m I tr 1 out.0.0.m # ()} 
TRANSk(tr) = 
ME:SS(tT) = LEAK(tr )  U ADD@?) U 
TRANS1 ( t ~ )  U RECl ( t r )  U 
0 UTo( t ~ )  
Lemma 4.1 The kernel function is closed under the 
generates relation, i.e. 
B k- m j kernel(m) C kernel(B) 
0 
Proof By considering all of the clauses that define 
the relation I-: A l l  A2, A3, M1, M2, K 1 ,  K 2 ,  K 3 ,  and 
K4. The result follows for each clause, so it is true for 
the relation. 0 
In order to prove confidentiality of NET with re- 
spect tlo a we will use certain properties of its compo- 
nents. The required properties are described in the 
following Ilemma. They combine information about 
the state of the components (as maintained in S and 
B) and, events that have occurred (extracted from the 
trace). A combination of information from both these 
sources is often required in establishing this kind of re- 
sult. State-based approaches commonly include a ‘his- 
tory’ variable as a component of the state in order to 
record trace information. The approach taken here is 
closer )to event-based approaches which provide some 
way of extracting the state of the system from its trace. 
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Lemma 4.2 The component processes meet the fol- 
lowing specifications: 
ENEMY ( s )  
E N E M Y ( S )  
MEDIUM(E)  
MEDIUM ( E )  
NODE1 
where 
E l s ( t r )  = 
kernel(ADD(tr))  C 
sat E 1 ,y ( tr ) 
sat E 2 s ( t r )  
s a t  M I S (  t r )  
s a t  M 2 s (  t r )  
s a t  N 1 s( tr)  
kernel(S) U kernel(1NIT) U kerne l (LEAK(tr ) )  
E 2 s ( t r )  = 
kernel( OUTo( tr ) )  C_ 
kernel(S) U kernel(IN1T) U kernel(LEAK( t r ) )  
M l s ( t r )  = 
kerne l (LEAK(tr ) )  C 
kernel(E) U kernel( TRANSi(tr)  U kerneZ(ADD(tr)) 
M 2 s ( t r )  = 
kerne l (REC(tr ) )  C 
kerneZ(B) U kernel( T R A N S l ( t r )  U kernel(ADD(tr))  
kernel( TRANS1 ( t r ) )  C_ kernel( REG1 ( t r ) )  
N l s ( t r )  = 
0 
Proof This is a standard mutual recursion proof in 
CSP. The full proof has been omitted for reasons of 
space. 0 
Some further process algebra manipulation (details 
in the full paper) finally yields the required result. 
Theorem 4.3 The network is secure: 
(NODE1 
MEDIUM 
E N E M Y )  s a t  tr out.O.0.a = () 
I[  trans.1, rec. l] /  
I [  leak,  a d d ,  kill11 
0 
Proof The strategy of the proof is as follows: we will 
use the properties established in Lemma 4.2 to prove 
that the kernels of all messages passed around the sys- 
tem must be contained in the kernel of INIT .  Since it 
is given that a kerne l ( lNIT) ,  it follows that a can 
never be passed along channel out.O. 
The proof could easily be adapted to take other 
nodes into account. In fact, descriptions of the other 
nodes are not even necessary, all that is required of 
them is that they meet some particular specification: 
for example, that they do not transmit any messages 
whose kernel intersects with that of a: 
NODE, sat 
kernel( TRANSj ( t r ) )  n kernel( a )  = 
Of course, more complex specifications might be more 
appropriate, for example that the messages added to 
the network by the nodes do not intersect with a 
(though those that were passed to the node may be 
passed back): 
NODE, s a t  
kernel( T R A N S j ( t r ) )  
n ( k e r n e l ( a )  \ kerne l (RECj( t r ) ) )  
= 0  
This latter specification is in fact met by NODE1. 
5 Discussion 
Model-checking 
This paper has been concerned with the expression 
of particular security properties and protocols within 
the framework of CSP, in order to provide a founda- 
tion for analysis and verification. This approach is mo- 
tivated in part by the availability of model-checking 
tools such as FDR[l], and the work has always pro- 
ceeded with an eye on applicability of these tools. How- 
ever, it is inevitable that there will be some practical 
difficulties, and it may be necessary to adapt some of 
the properties. When this becomes necessary, we will 
have to establish that the properties we are checking do 
indeed correspond to the properties presented in this 
paper, or at least that results obtained by application 
of the tools allow us make the inferences we require. 
For example, the sets PLAINTEXT and 
MESSAGES will generally be infinite, even when 
the base sets are very small. This makes them unsuit- 
able for direct analysis by means of model-checking 
using current (February 1996) state-of-the-art technoli- 
ogy, though the situation will improve as value-passing 
is introduced. Techniques such as Skolemisation 
(deducing results concerning all messages from veri- 
fications on place-holders) might also be appropriate 
here. In any case some simplifications will have to  be 
made (perhaps concerning the maximum number of 
encryptions) in order to regain finitude of the message 
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space; and some additional justification of these 
assumptions will then be requhed to derive general 
correctness. This should not present any problems, 
since the protocols themselves will only perform 
encryptions to a certain level (generally no more than 
two) and so any interference involving deeper levels 
will be detected in any case. But nevertheless it will 
be necessary to prove that the imposition of a bound 
does not rule out any attacks on a protocol, in order 
to have confidence in the results of the analysis. 
Additional modelling issues 
The modelling of the enemy as a separate process 
allows for the possibility of introducing tactics in the 
state space exploration when model-checking, for ex- 
ample by restricting the number of messages that the 
enemy will place on the medium. By accompanying 
enemy interference with the performance of events, 
we may introduce tactics by introducing further con- 
straints in parallel, refining the system. This may prove 
useful when attempting to detect flaws, since a flaw in 
a refinement will be a flaw in the original system, but 
correctness of refined protocols does not imply that the 
original one is correct unless it can be demonstrated 
that the introduction of the tactic does not rule out 
any possible attacks. 
Non-repudiation seems to be a completely different 
kind of property. Each party in a non-repudiating ex- 
change of messages is concerned that the other might 
not be honest. Furthermore, it is not enough for each 
party to be satisfied that the other party received the 
requhed messages; each party aims to obtain evidence 
sufficient to convince an outside party that the ex- 
change took place, 
Directions 
Meadows’ example appears to be particularly 
straightforward (which is what makes it a good ex- 
ample for comparing different approaches) because the 
proof rests on the fact that at no stage is the infor- 
mation required to generate the message a ever intro- 
duced into the system; the invariant for the system is 
therefore fairly simple, and does not rely particularly 
on encryption and decryption properties, but simply 
on the property that no generation of messages by the 
t- relation can introduce new information. It will be 
harder to find suitable invariants for scenarios where 
information is present in encrypted form (such as com- 
munication between two users via a shared key), where 
it will be necessary to prove that at no stage could it 
ever be decrypted. More subtle properties Qf encryp- 
tion and decryption will be required. 
It seems disappointing that such a simple example 
as Meadows’ still requires a lengthy proof. However, 
part of the point of doing such a proof is to explore 
the relationship between the language-theoretic ideas 
underpinning it and the invariant of the CSP recursive 
description. It seems likely that this relationship will 
be similar in many proof of this type, and we would 
hope to obtain theorems which allow results concern- 
ing the language of messages that can be generated 
to be translated immediately to the CSP setting with- 
out the need for a laborious manual translation. A 
close relationship between CSP protocol descriptions 
and rules for generating messages would allow more 
natural proofs. Once this i s  achieved we would expect 
the result that a particular set of rules cannot genes- 
ate any message containing a to translate immediately 
into the result that the corresponding CSP description 
has the required confidentiality property. 
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